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Abstract
To assess in quantitative terms the “resilience” of systems, it is necessary to ask
first what is meant by “resilience”, whether it is a single attribute or several, which
measure or measures appropriately characterise it. This chapter covers: the tech-
nical meanings that the word “resilience” has assumed, and its role in the debates
about how best to achieve reliability, safety, etc.; the different possible measures
for the attributes that the word designates, with their different pros and cons in
terms of ease of empirical assessment and suitability for supporting prediction and
decision making; the similarity between these concepts, measures and attached
problems in various fields of engineering, and how lessons can be propagated be-
tween them.
This a chapter of the book “Resilience Assessment and Evaluation of Computing Systems”
(Wolter, K.; Avritzer, A.; Vieira, M.; van Moorsel, A. (Eds.). Springer, 2012, ISBN 978-3-642-29031-2
http://www.springer.com/computer/communication+networks/book/
978-3-642-29031-2).
The original publication is available from www.springerlink.com
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1 Introduction
Measuring or assessing a quality for any object, e.g. “ resilience” for a system,
requires clarity about what this quality is.
The word “resilience” has become popular in recent years in the area of ICT
(Information and Communication Technology) and policy related to ICT, as part
of a more general trend (for instance, the word “resilience” is in favour in the area
of critical infrastructure protection). The increasing use of this word creates the
doubt whether it is just a new linguistic fashion, for referring to what is commonly
studied, pursued and assessed under names like “fault tolerance”, “dependabil-
ity” (a term mostly restricted to ICT usage) “security”, “Reliability, Availability
Maintainability and Safety” (RAMS), “human reliability”, and so on, or it actually
denotes new concepts. While there may be a component of fashion, the increased
use of the word “resilience” is often meant to highlight either novel attention to
these problems or a plea for a shift of focus in addressing them. It is useful to
consider what these new foci may be and whether they require new concepts and
new measures. Technical, and especially quantitative, reasoning about “resilience”
requires clear definitions of these concepts, whether old or new.
Without reviewing in detail the multiple uses of “resilience”, it is useful to
recognise how the technical problems and debates in which it appears in differ-
ent areas of application are related, highlighting similarities and differences in the
problems they pose for quantitative reasoning, including measurement and bench-
marking, and retrospective assessment as well as prediction.
The word “resilience”, from the Latin verb resilire (re-salire: to jump back),
means literally the tendency or ability to spring back, and thus the ability of a body
to recover its normal size and shape after being pushed or pulled out of shape,
and therefore figuratively any ability to recover to normality after a disturbance.
Thus the word is used technically with reference to materials recovering elastically
after being compressed, and also in a variety of disciplines to designate properties
related to being able to withstand shocks and deviations from the intended state
and go back to a pre-existing, or a desirable or acceptable, state. Other engineering
concepts that are related to resilience therefore include for instance fault tolerance,
redundancy, stability, feedback control.
A review of scientific uses of the word “resilience” for the European project
ReSIST(“Resilience for Survivability in IST”) [1] identified uses in child psychol-
ogy and psychiatry, ecology, business and industrial safety. In many cases, this
word is used with its general, everyday meaning. Some users, however, adopt
specialised meanings, to use “resilience” as a technical term.
The premise for calling for an everyday word to be used with a new specialised
meaning is that there is a concept that needs to have its own name, for conve-
nience of communication, and lacks one. The concept is sometimes a new one
(“entropy”, for instance), or a new refinement of old concepts (“energy”, for in-
stance), or just a concept that needs to be referred to more often than previously
(because the problems to be discussed have evolved) and thus requires a specialised
word. Sometimes, the motivation is that words previously used for the same con-
cept have been commandeered to denote, in a certain technical community, a more
restricted meaning: for instance, after the word “reliability” acquired a technical
meaning that was much more restrictive than its everyday meaning, the word “de-
pendability” came to be used, by parts of the ICT technical community, to denote
the everyday meaning of “reliability” [2].
For the word “resilience”, a tendency has been to use it, in each specific com-
munity, to indicate a more flexible, more dynamic and/or less prescriptive approach
to achieving dependability, compared to common practices in that community.
Thus the above-cited document [1], for instance, concluded that a useful meaning
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to apply to “resilience” for current and future ICT is “ability to deliver, maintain,
improve service when facing threats and evolutionary changes”: that is, the im-
portant extension to emphasise in comparison with words like “fault tolerance”
was the fact that the perturbations that current and future systems have to tolerate
include change. While existing practices of dependable design deal reasonably
well with achieving and predicting dependability in ICT systems that are relatively
closed and unchanging, the tendency to making all kinds of ICT systems more in-
terconnected, open, and able to change without new intervention by designers, is
making existing techniques inadequate to deliver the same levels of dependability.
For instance, evolution itself of the system and its uses impairs dependability: new
components “create” system design faults or vulnerabilities by feature interaction
or by triggering pre-existing bugs in existing components; likewise, new patterns
of use arise, new interconnections open the system to attack by new potential ad-
versaries, and so on [3].
For a comparison with another field of engineering, a document on “infrastruc-
ture resilience” [4] identifies “resilience” as an extension of “protection”. As an
example of the direction for this extension, this paper questions whether burying
the cables of a power distribution grid to prevent hurricane damage is “resilience”,
but suggests that installing redundant cabling is.
An important specialised use of the word “resilience” has emerged with “re-
silience engineering”, a movement, or a new sub-discipline, in the area of safety
(or, more generally, performance under extreme conditions) of complex socio-
technical systems. Here, the word “resilience” is used to identify enhanced ability
to deal with the unexpected, or a more flexible approach to achieving safety than
the current mainstream approaches. The meaning is somewhat different between
authors, which need not cause confusion if we consider “resilience engineering”,
rather than “resilience”, as the focal concept for these researchers, and actually a
neologism, designating an area of studies and the ongoing debate about it. This
area will be further discussed below.
From the viewpoint of the problems of quantitative assessment, measurement
and benchmarking, the goals of these activities and the difficulties they present,
there is no sharp boundary between the socio-technical systems that are of con-
cern to ICT specialists and those addressed by “resilience engineering”. There
are undoubtedly differences in the typical scales of the systems considered, but
the progress in ICT towards the “future Internet” and greater interconnection of
ICT with other infrastructures and activities are cancelling these differences [3].
Most dependability problems in ICT have always involved some social and human
factors influencing dependability, for instance through design methods and con-
straints, or through the maintenance or use of technical systems. In this sense, ICT
dependability is about socio-technical systems. As ICT becomes more pervasive
and interlaced with human activities, the dependability of the technical compo-
nents in isolation may become a minor part of the necessary study of dependability
and thus of resilience. For example, this occurs in a hospital or air traffic control
system, where automated and human tasks interact, and contribute redundancy for
each other, on a fine-grain scale. It also occurs where large scale systems involve
networks of responsibilities across multiple organisations, as in the provision of
services (possibly through open, dynamic collaboration) on the present or future
Internet.
In view of these similarities and disappearing boundaries between different cat-
egories of systems, this short survey, written from the vantage point of practices in
the technical side of ICT dependability assessment, tries to emphasise the possible
new problems, or desirable new viewpoints, that may come from the progressive
extension of the domain that ICT specialists have to study towards systems with a
more important and more complex social component.
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2 The “resilience engineering” movement
The title “resilience engineering” has been adopted recently by a movement, or
emerging discipline or community, started around a set of safety experts dealing
mostly with complex socio-technical systems, like for instance industrial plant,
railways, hospitals. A few symposia have taken place focusing on this topic and
books have been published. This movement uses the term “resilience engineer-
ing” to designate “a new way of thinking about safety” [5]. The focus of these
researchers is on moving beyond limitations they see in the now-established forms
of the pursuit of safety: too much focus on identifying all possible mechanisms
leading to accidents and providing pre-planned defences against them; too little at-
tention to the potential of people for responding to deviations from desirable states
and behaviours of the system. Thus the resilience engineering authors underscore
the needs for reactivity and flexibility, e.g. “The traits of resilience include expe-
rience, intuition, improvisation, expecting the unexpected, examining preconcep-
tions, thinking outside the box, and taking advantage of fortuitous events. Each
trait is complementary, and each has the character of a double-edged sword.” [6].
In using the term “resilience”, there is a range between authors focusing on the
resilient behaviour of the socio-technical system — its visibly rebounding from
deviations and returning to (or continuing in) a desirable way of functioning —
and those who focus on the characteristics they believe the system must have in
order to exhibit such behaviour, like for instance the cultural characteristics and
attitudes in the above quote. This degree of ambiguity need not cause confusion
if we simply use the “resilience engineering” phrase to designate a set of related
concerns, rather than “resilience” as a specific technical term. It points, however,
at the variety of attributes — whatever we may call them — that are inevitably of
interest to measure or predict.
Importantly, authors in “resilience engineering” underscore the difference be-
tween “resilience” and “safety”, the former being just one of the possible means
to achieve the latter. Their concern is often one of balance, as they see excessive
emphasis on (and perhaps complacency about the effectiveness of) static means
for achieving safety, designed in response to accidents, while they see a need for a
culture of self-awareness, learning how things really work in the organisation (real
processes may be very different from the designed, “official” procedures), taking
advantage of the workers’ resourcefulness and experience in dealing with anoma-
lies, paying attention to the potential for unforeseen risks, fostering fresh views
and criticism of an organisation’s own model of risk, and so on. On the other hand,
safety can be achieved in organisations that do not depend on “resilience” in this
sense of the word, but on rigid, pre-designed and hierarchical approaches [7].
3 The appeal of resilience and fault tolerance
Before discussing issues of measurement and quantitative assessment, it is useful
to identify some concepts and historical changes that are common to the various
technical fields we consider.
When something is required to operate dependably (in a general sense, in-
cluding “being secure against intentional harm”), the means available for ensuring
this dependability include mixes of what in the ICT world are often called “fault
avoidance” and “fault tolerance” [2]. The former means making components (in-
cluding, by a stretch of the word “component”, the design of the system, with its
potential defects that may cause failures of the system) less likely to contain or
develop faults, the latter means making the system able to tolerate the effects of
these faults.
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3.1 Historical shifts between “fault avoidance” and “fault
tolerance”
Historically, the balance between the two approaches is subject to shifts, as is the
level of system aggregation at which fault tolerance is applied. For instance, to
protect the services delivered by a computer, a designer may add inside the com-
puter redundant component(s) to form a fault-tolerant computer. Alternatively, the
designer of a system using the computer (say, an automated assembly line) might
provide a rapid repair service, or stand-by computers to be switched in by man-
ual intervention, or manual controls for operators to take control if the computer
fails: all these latter provisions make the control function of the assembly line
fault-tolerant (to different degrees). This is a case of shift from fault tolerance in
the architecture of a system component (the computer) to fault tolerance in the
architecture of the system (the assembly line).
Fault tolerance (for various purposes, e.g., masking permanently disabled com-
ponents, preventing especially severe effects of failures1, recovering from unde-
sired transients) is a normal feature of much engineering design as well as organ-
isation design. Fault tolerance against some computer-caused problems is nowa-
days a normal feature within computer architecture, but over time, as computers in
an organisation or engineered plant become more numerous, the space for forms of
fault tolerance “outside the computer” increased. Much of the computer hardware
and software is obtained off-the-shelf, meaning that for the organisation achieving
great confidence in their dependability may be unfeasible or expensive, but on the
other hand there is a choice of alternatives for error confinement and degraded or
reconfigured operation (relying on mixes of people and technology) if only some
of these components fail, and for selectively deploying redundant automation (or
redundant people) where appropriate.
Shifts of balance between fault tolerance and fault avoidance, and across lev-
els of application of fault tolerance, occur over time with changes in technology,
system size and requirements. Shifts away from fault tolerance are naturally moti-
vated by components becoming more dependable, or their failure behaviour better
known (so that fault tolerance is revealed to be overkill), or the system depend-
ability requirements becoming (or being recognised to be) less stringent. Shifts
towards more fault tolerance are often due to the observation that fault avoidance
does not seem to deliver sufficient dependability, or has reached a point of dimin-
ishing returns, and in particular that good fault tolerance will tolerate a variety of
different anomalous situation and faults, including unexpected ones. Thus, fault
tolerance for instance often proves to be an effective defence against faults that
the designers of components do not know to be possible and thus would not have
attempted to avoid.
Examples of these factors recur in the history of computing, and can be traced
to some extent through the arguments presented at the time to argue that the state
of technology and application demanded a shift of emphasis: for instance in the
papers by Avizienis in the 1970s [8] arguing for a return to more fault tolerance
in computers; those of the “Recovery Oriented Computing” project in the early
years of the 21st century [9] arguing for attention to more dynamic fault tolerance,
in systems comprising multiple computers and operators. In the area of security,
similar reasons motivated arguments for more of a “fault tolerance” oriented ap-
proach [10], later reinforced by concerns about the inevitable use of off-the-shelf
computers and operating systems [2]. Similar considerations have applied to the
proposals for fault tolerance against software faults [11, 12]. More recently, a call
1Including “system design failures”: all components function as specified, but it turns out that in the
specific circumstances the combination of these specified behaviours ends in system failure: the system’s
design was “faulty”.
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for papers on “Resiliency in High Performance Computing” [13] points at how the
scaling up of massively parallel computations implies that the likelihood of at least
one component failing during the computation has become too high if the compu-
tation is not able to tolerate such failures; similar considerations have arisen for the
number of components in chips, or networks, etc, repeatedly over the years. For an
example in larger systems that go beyond ICT, we may consider titles like “Mov-
ing from Infrastructure Protection to Infrastructure Resilience” [14], advocating a
shift from a perceived over-emphasis on blocking threats before they affect critical
infrastructure (e.g., electrical distribution grids) to making the latter better able to
react to disruption. All these arguments must rely implicitly on some quantifica-
tion of the risk involved by each alternative defensive solution — a sound argument
about which solution entails the least risk, even without giving explicit numerical
risk estimates for the individual solutions — although this quantification is not
very visible in the literature.
3.2 Evolving vs unchanging redundancy
A related, recurrent line of debate is that advocating more flexible and powerful
fault tolerance, in which fault tolerance mechanisms, rather than following nar-
rowly pre-defined strategies, can react autonomously and even evolve in response
to new situations, like the human mind or perhaps the human immune system
[15, 16]. Some of the recent “autonomic computing” literature echoes these themes
[17]. The trade-off here is that one may have to accept a risk that the fault-tolerant
mechanisms themselves will exhibit, due to their flexibility and complexity, un-
foreseen and sometime harmful behaviour, in return for an expectation of better
ability to deal with variable, imperfectly known and evolving threats. The chal-
lenge is to assess this balance of risks, and to what extent a sound quantitative
approach is feasible.
In the social sciences’ approach to these problems, observations about the im-
portance of redundancy and flexibility underpin the literature about “high reliabil-
ity organisations” [18] and to some extent about “safety cultures”. In this picture,
the “resilience engineering” movement could be seen as just another shift in which
dynamic reaction (fault tolerance) to anomalies is seen as preferable to prior pro-
visions against them, as a precaution against unexpected anomalies. Its claim to
novelty with respect to the community where it originated is in part a focus on the
importance of the unexpected. This summary of course does not do justice to the
wealth of specific competence about safety in organisations in the “resilience engi-
neering” literature, or about computer failure, human error, distribution networks
etc to be found in the other specialised literature mentioned above. Our goal here is
to identify broad similarities and differences and their implications on assessment,
measuring and benchmarking.
Much current emphasis in “resilience engineering” is about flexibility of peo-
ple and organisations, not just in reacting to individual incidents and anomalous
situations, but also in learning from them and thus developing an ability to react
to the set of problems concretely occurring in operation, even if not anticipated
by designers of the machinery or of the organisation. There is for instance an
emphasis, marking recent evolution in the “human factors” literature, on the im-
portance of understanding work practices as they are, as opposed as to how they
have been designed to be via procedures and automation of tasks. The real prac-
tices include for instance “workarounds” for problems of the official procedures,
and may contribute to resilience and/or damage it, by creating gaps in the defences
planned by designers and managers. It is appropriate to consider differences iden-
tified by “resilience engineering” authors between the “resilience engineering” and
the older “high reliability organisation” movement. Perhaps the most cited paper
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[18] from the latter discussed how flight operations on U.S. Navy aircraft carri-
ers achieved high success rates with remarkably good safety. This paper focused
on four factors: “Self-Design and Self-Replication” (processes are created by the
people involved, in a continuous and flexible learning process), the “Paradox of
High Turnover” (turnover of staff requires continuous training and conservatism
in procedures — both seen as generally positive influences — but also supports
diffusion of useful innovation), “Authority Overlays” (distributed authority allow-
ing local decisions by low-ranking people as well as producing higher level de-
cisions through co-operation and negotiation), “Redundancy” (in the machinery
and supplies but also in overlapping responsibilities for monitoring and in built-
in extra staffing with adaptability of people to take on different jobs as required).
In contrast, a paper about how “resilience engineering” [19] differs from this ap-
proach refers to healthcare organisations and how their culture and lack of bud-
getary margins severely limit the applicability of the four factors claimed to be so
important on aircraft carriers; it points at the potential for improving resilience by,
for instance, IT systems that improve communication within the organisation and
thus distributed situational awareness and ability to react to disturbances. Another
valuable discussion paper [20] emphasises the steps that lead from the general so-
ciological appreciation of common issues — exemplified by the “high reliability
organisation” literature — to an engineering approach with considerations of cost
and effectiveness in detail.
4 Resilience and fault tolerance against the un-
expected
We see that a frequently used argument for both fault tolerance (or “resilience”,
seen as going beyond standard practices of fault tolerance in a given community)
in technical systems and more general “resilience” in socio-technical systems is
based on these being broad-spectrum defences. Given uncertainty about what
faults a system may contain or what external shocks and attacks it has to deal
with, it seems better to invest in flexible, broad-spectrum defensive mechanisms
to react to undesired situations during operation, rather than in pre-operation mea-
sures (stronger components, more design verification) that are necessarily limited
by the designers’ incomplete view of possible future scenarios.
4.1 Competing risks; the risk of complex defences
This argument can, however, be misleading. It is true that general-purpose redun-
dancy and/or increased resources (or attention) dedicated to coping with distur-
bances as they arise, or to predicting them, can often deal with threats that design-
ers had not included in their scenarios. But there will also be threats that bypass
these more flexible defences, or that are created by them. An example can be found
in the evolution of modular redundancy at the level of whole computers. The “soft-
ware implemented fault tolerance” (SIFT) concept in the 1970s [21], the precursor
of many current fault-tolerant solutions, responded to the fact that one could af-
fordably replicate entire computations running on separate computers, so that the
resulting system would tolerate any failure of any hardware or software compo-
nent within a single computer (or communication channel). This was certainly a
more general approach than either more expenditure on fault avoidance without
redundancy, or ad-hoc fault tolerance for foreseen failures of each component in a
single computer. It was a more powerful approach in that it may well tolerate the
effects of more faults, e.g. some design faults in the assembly of the computer or
in its software (thanks to loose synchronisation between the redundant computers
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[22]). But the SIFT approach also ran into the surprise of “inconsistent failures”:
the same loose, redundant organisation that gives the system some of its added
resilience makes it vulnerable to a specific failure mode. A faulty unit, by trans-
mitting inconsistent messages to other units, could prevent the healthy majority of
the system from enforcing correct system behaviour. To tolerate a single computer
failure might require four-fold redundancy (and a design that took into account this
newly discovered problem) rather than three-fold as previously believed. This was
an unexpected possibility, although now, with experience grown from its discov-
ery, it is easy to demonstrate it, using a simple model of how such a system could
operate.
Other events that may surprise designers may be unexpected hardware fail-
ure modes; operators performing specific sequences of actions that trigger subtle
design faults; new modes of attack that “create” new categories of security vulner-
abilities; threats that bypass the elaborate defences created by design (ultra-high
availability systems go down because maintenance staff leave them running on
backup batteries until they run out, testing at a nuclear power plant involves over-
riding safety systems until it is too late for avoiding an accident – the Chernobyl
disaster – attackers circumvent technical security mechanisms in ICT via social
engineering); in short, anything that comes from outside the necessarily limiting
model of the world that the designers use. Some such surprises arise from incom-
plete analysis of the possible behaviours of a complex system and its environment
(cf the Ariane V first-flight accident [23]). Perhaps the incompleteness of analy-
sis is inevitable given complexity, and indeed there is a now common claim that
accidents — at least in “mature” organisations and engineered systems — tend to
originate from subtle combinations of circumstances rather than direct propagation
from a single component failure[24]).2 On the other hand, designers also choose
“surprises” to which their systems will be vulnerable: they explicitly design fault
tolerance that will not cope with those events that they consider unlikely, trading
off savings in cost or complexity against increases in risk that are (to their knowl-
edge) acceptable.
In the ICT area, it is tempting to see “surprises” as manifestations of designer
incompetence, and indeed, in a rapidly evolving field with rapidly increasing mar-
kets, many will be ignorant about what for others is basic competence. But there
is also a component of inevitable surprises. In other areas of engineering it has
been observed that the limits of accepted models and practices are found via fail-
ure [25, 26], usually of modest importance (prototype or component tests showing
deviations from model predictions, unexpected maintenance requirements in op-
eration, etc), but sometimes spectacular and catastrophic (the popular textbook
examples — the Tacoma Narrows bridge, the De Havilland Comet ).
4.2 Quantifying surprises?
Thus, the argument that a more “resilient” design — more open-ended forms of
redundancy — offers extra protection is correct, but when it comes to estimating
how much extra protection, or which form of redundancy will be more effective —
when we need measurement and quantitative assessment — there is a difference
between threats. There is a range of degrees to which quantitative reasoning is
useful, perhaps best illustrated via examples. For a well known and frequent hard-
ware failure mode, we may be able to trust predictions of its frequency, and thus
predict the system reliability gain afforded by a specific redundant design, if some
other modelling assumptions are correct. For other forms of failure, we may have
2Although many authors point out that accidents caused by single component failures are still common.
A component failure occurs in a system design that happens to omit those defences that would prevent that
specific failure from causing an accident.
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very imprecise ideas about their frequency — for instance, this usually applies,
at the current state of practice, to software failures in highly reliable systems —
and yet, we can decide which designs will tolerate specific failure patterns, and
via probabilistic modelling even decide whether a design is more resilient than an-
other one given certain plausible assumptions. Last, there are surprises that violate
our modelling assumptions. Designers can try to reduce them by keeping an open
mind, and making the system itself “keep an open mind”, but have no indication
of how successful they are going to be. In the case of organisations, it may well
be, for instance, that organisational choices that improve resilience against certain
disturbances will be ineffective or counterproductive against others [27].
Insofar as resilience is obtained by making available extra resources, limits
on resources demand that designers choose against which threats they will deploy
more redundant resources. Limits on resources also recommend more flexible
designs, in which these resources can deal with more different challenges. Again,
these qualitative considerations demand, to be applicable to concrete decisions,
quantification (at least adequate to support rough comparisons) of the risk and
costs of different solutions.
This set of considerations has highlighted many areas where measurement and
assessment of resilience or fault tolerance are desirable, and started to evoke a
picture of measures that may be useful and of the difficulties they may involve. The
discussion that follows looks at choices of attributes to measure, and difficulties of
measurement and prediction, in some more detail, taking a viewpoint inspired by
“hard” quantification approaches in engineering and considering some of the issues
created by extension towards more complex socio-technical systems.
5 Quantifying resilience: its attributes, and their
possible measures
In quantitative assessment there are always two kinds of potential difficulties:
defining measures that usefully characterise the phenomena of interest; and as-
sessing the values (past or future) of these measures.
About the first difficulty, dependability and resilience are broad concepts en-
compassing multiple attributes, so that there are multiple possible measures. The
discussion that follows will take for granted that there are many dependability
attributes of potential interest, which are different and may well be in conflict un-
der the specific constraints of a certain system: for instance, pursuing safety —
ability to avoid specific categories of mishaps — may conflict with the pursuit of
availability — the ability to deliver service for a high fraction of the time (see for
instance[2] for a high-level set of definitions) Irrespective of the specific depend-
ability attribute of interest, we will summarily characterise categories of measures
related to fault tolerance and resilience, with some discussion of their uses and
difficulties in measurement and prediction.
The categories will be introduced in terms of “systems” (meaning anything
from a small gadget to a complex organisation) that have to behave properly despite
“disturbances” (an intentionally generic term, to cover component faults inside the
system, shocks from outside, overloads, anomalous states, no matter how reached).
The sections that follow
• first discuss categories of measures in common use in quantitative reason-
ing about ICT, both as measures at whole-system level and as parameters,
describing components and their roles, in mathematical models for deriving
such whole-systems measures :
Fault tolerance and resilience: meanings, measures and assessment 11
– measures of dependability in the presence of disturbances, which may
be estimated empirically in operation or in a laboratory, or through
probabilistic models (as functions of measures at component level), as
discussed in other chapters of this book
– measures of the amount of disturbances that a system can tolerate, typ-
ically obtained from analysing a system’s design
– measures of probability of correct service given that a disturbance oc-
curred (“coverage factors”), typically estimated empirically, often in a
laboratory
• and then proceed to examine more speculative areas:
– proposed predictors of resilience in socio-technical systems
– more detailed measures that discriminate between different forms of
“resilient” behaviours.
While pointing out differences between categories of systems and types of “re-
silience”, the discussion will identify problems that they share and that may rec-
ommend importing insights from some areas of study to others.
5.1 Measures of dependable service despite disturbances
The first category of measures that give information about resilience are simply
measures of dependability of the service delivered by a system that is subject to
disturbances. The better the system worked despite them, the more resilient it
was. Indeed, a question is why we would want to measure “resilience” or “fault
tolerance” attributes, rather than “dependability” attributes. The former are just
means for achieving the latter.
For instance, an availability measure for a function of a system, obtained over
a long enough period of use in a certain environment (pattern of usage, physical
stresses, misuse, attacks etc), will be a realistic assessment of how well that func-
tion tolerates, or “is resilient” to, that set of stresses and shocks 3.
This kind of measure is certainly useful when applied to documenting past
dependability. It will be useful, for instance, in invoking a penalty clause in a con-
tract, if the achieved availability falls short of the level promised. It will also have
some uses in prediction. Suppose that the system is a computer workstation used
for well-defined tasks in a relatively unchanging environment. A robust measure
of past availability (“robust” may imply for instance repeating the measure over
multiple workstations of the same type, to avoid bias from variation between indi-
vidual instances) will be trusted to be a reasonable prediction of future availability
(if the environment does not change). Measures on two types of workstations will
3A conceptual problem arises here, which will recur in different guises throughout this discussion. To
use an example, suppose that two computers are made to operate in an environment with high levels of
electromagnetic noise. Of the two, computer A is heavily shielded and mostly immune to the noise. The
other one, computer B, is not, and suffers frequent transient failures, but always recovers from them so
that correct service is maintained. The two thus prove equally dependable under this amount of stress, but
many would say that only B is so dependable thanks to its “resilience”: A just avoids disturbances; only
B “bounces back” from them. Should we prefer B over A? Suppose that over repeated tests, B sometimes
fails unrecoverably, but A does not. Clearly, A’s lack of “resilience” is then not a handicap. Why then
should we focus on assessing “resilience”, rather than dependability? Or at least, should we not define the
quality of interest (whether we call it “resilience” or not) in terms of “correct behaviour despite pressure
to behave incorrectly”? An answer might be that the resilience mechanisms that B has demonstrated to
have will probably help it in situations in which A’s single-minded defence (heavy shielding) will not help.
But then the choice between A and B becomes an issue of analysing how much better than A B would
fare in various situations, and how likely each situation is. Measures of “resilience” in terms of recovery
after faltering are just useful information towards estimating measures of such “dependability in a range of
different situations”.
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be trusted to indicate whether one will offer substantially better availability than
the other.
The difficulty of extrapolation
If we wish to compare systems (workstations, in this example), that have not been
operated in the same environment, we will sometimes define a reference load (of
usage as well as stresses etc) — a “benchmark” workload and stress (or fault) load,
in the current IT parlance [28]. Here, the broader “resilience” literature about engi-
neering and socio-technical systems has to confront difficulties that are also evident
for strict computer dependability evaluation [29], but with differences of degree.
These difficulties can be generally characterised as limits to the extrapolation of
measures to environments that are different from those where the measures were
obtained. If a system copes well in the presence of one type of disturbances but
less well with another type, changing the relative weights of these two types of
disturbances will change the degree of dependability that will be observed. There
will not even be a single indicator of “stressfulness” of an environment, so that we
can say that if a system exhibited — say — 99% availability under the benchmark
stress, it will exhibit at least 99% availability in any ’less stressful” environment
[30]. Likewise, we won’t be able to trust that if system A is more dependable (from
the viewpoint of interest: e.g., more reliable) than system B in the benchmark envi-
ronment, it will still be more dependable in another environment. An extreme, but
not unusual case of the extrapolation problem is the difficulty of predictions about
systems that are “one of a kind” (from a specific configuration of a computer sys-
tem, to a specific ship manned by a specific crew, to a specific spontaneous, tempo-
rary alliance of computers collaborating on a specific task in the “future internet”)
or will be exposed to “one of a kind” situations: that is (to give a pragmatic def-
inition), systems or situations for which we have no confidence that the measures
taken elsewhere, or at a previous time, will still prove accurate. Again, extreme
examples are easily found for the human component of systems: an organisation
that appears unchanged, after some time from a previous observation, in terms of
staff roles, machinery, procedures, may in reality have changed heavily due to staff
turnover, or ageing, or even just the experience accumulated in the meantime (for
instance, a period without accidents might reduce alertness). Here arises the first
reason for going beyond whole-system dependability measures: they do not pro-
duce an understanding of why a system exhibits a certain level of dependability in
a given environment — how each part of the system succumbed or survived the
disturbances, which behaviours of which parts accomplished recovery, why they
were effective — which could turn into a model for predicting dependability as a
function of the demands and stresses in other environments.
Another problem with extrapolation is often created intentionally, as a neces-
sary compromise. If we want a benchmark to exercise the whole set of defences a
system has, we need the environment to “attack” these defences. This may require
the benchmark load to condense in a short time many more stress events than are to
be expected in real use; but some aspects of resilience are affected by the frequency
of stresses. If the system being “benchmarked” includes people, their alertness and
fatigue levels are affected. If it involves slow recovery processes (say, background
processes that check and correct large bodies of data), an unrealistically high fre-
quency of disturbances may defeat these mechanisms, although they would work
without problems in most realistic environments.
Last, there is the problem of resilience against endogenous stresses. These exist
in all kinds of systems: a computer may enter an erroneous state due to a software
design fault being activated or an operator entering inappropriate commands; a
factory may suffer from a worker fainting, or from a fire in a certain piece of
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machinery; and so on. If we wish a common benchmark to measure resilience
against these kinds of disturbance, it will need to include some simulation of such
events. But this may produce unfair, misleading measures. Perhaps a computer
that has very little tolerance to errors caused by internal design faults has been
designed this way for the right reasons, since it has no design faults of the types
that it cannot tolerate; the less a computer interface tends to cause operator errors,
the less the computer needs to tolerate them; the less a factory tends to cause
workers to become ill on the job, the less it needs to operate smoothly through
such events; etc.
This unfairness also has a beneficial aspect, though: it allows a benchmark to
give at least some information about resilience against the unexpected or unplanned-
for disturbances. The benchmark deals with hypothetical situations. What if in a
factory where nobody ever becomes ill, one day somebody does? What if the com-
puter does have unsuspected design flaws? Likewise, modern regulations require
many safety measures for all systems of a certain kind, irrespective of the prob-
ability, for a specific system, of the situations in which they would be useful. In
these circumstances, a dependability or safety “benchmark” (from a fault injection
experiment in a computer to an emergency drill in a factory) verifies that certain
precautions are in place, and thus certain stresses are likely be tolerated if they were
ever to happen. However, engineering for better dependability under a benchmark
situation does not necessarily improve dependability in any operational situation
different from the benchmark.
5.2 Measures of tolerable disturbances
A type of attributes that often allow simple and intuitive measures, and thus are
heavily used, is the extent of deviation (or damage or disturbance) that a system
can tolerate while still later returning to the desired behaviour or state (or still
preserving some invariant property about its behaviour, e.g. some safety property:
choosing different invariants will define different measures).
Thus, in ICT it is common to characterise a certain fault-tolerant computer
design as able to mask4 (without repair) up to k faulty components; or a communi-
cation code as able to detect (or to reconstruct the original message despite) up to
t single-bit errors; or that a user interface will tolerate up to m erroneous inputs in
one transaction; etc. Likewise, in the world of larger systems, we can rate a ship as
being able to self-right from a tilt of so many degrees from the upright position; or
a factory’s staffing level as being calculated to allow for so many absences without
loss of productivity. In ecology, a proposed measure of “resilience” of an environ-
ment is the size of a basin of attraction, in its state space: the distance by which the
environment’s state may be moved from a stable point without becoming unstable
and moving into another basin of attraction (this distance measure is proposed to
be used with a complementary measure of “resistance”: the “force” needed for a
given shift in the state space) [31].
To generalise, this set of attributes, and their measures, are about how far the
object of interest can be pushed without losing its ability to rebound or recover; or
how quickly it will rebound, or how closely its state after rebounding will resemble
the state before the disturbance. To reason properly about these attributes of a
system, it is important to recognise them as separate: system A may be “more
resilient” than system B from one of these viewpoints, and “less resilient” from
another one; for instance, A may be slower than B in recovering from a disturbance
of a certain size, but able to recover from a more extreme disturbance than B can.
4“Masking” usually meaning that the externally observed behaviour of the system shows no effect of
the fault.
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A great advantage of this type of measures is that for many ICT systems they
are easy to obtain directly from their designs: so long as the implementation
matches the design in some essential characteristics, we know that certain patterns
of faults or disturbances are tolerated. These measures are also typically robust to
the extrapolation problem.
If “measuring” on the design is unsatisfactory (for instance we expect the im-
plementation to have flaws; or the required measure is too complex to calculate),
we would rely on observations of the system in operation. There may be difficulties
in obtaining enough observations of “disturbances” close to the limit, in knowing
where the limit is (for systems that should not be tested to destruction), and in
deciding whether the system’s resilient reaction is deterministic, that is, whether
observing successful recovery from a certain extent of disturbances allows us to
infer 100% probability of recovery. Again, socio-technical systems offer the most
striking examples of the doubts that can affect estimates of these measures.
A limitation of these “maximum tolerable disturbance” measures, even for sys-
tems where they are easy to obtain, is that we may well be interested in character-
ising how well a system rebounds from smaller disturbances. For instance, given
a form of fault tolerance that allows for some degradation of service, we may then
want to measure not just how far the system can be pushed before failing alto-
gether, but the relationship between the size of disturbances and the degradation
of performance. For instance, for a network (of any kind) one might measure the
residual throughput (or other measure of performance) as a function of the amount
of network components lost (or other measure of faults or disturbances); this kind
of function has been proposed [32] for resilience of critical infrastructures, leaving
open the question of which single-number characterisation (if any) of these curves
would be useful in practice. We will return later to characterisations of resilience
as a function rather than a single, synthetic measure.
5.3 Measures of “coverage factors”
If we recognise that for most systems of interest the resilient behaviour is non-
deterministic in practice5, we are no longer interested in whether the system will
rebound from a disturbance but in the probability of it successfully rebounding;
or perhaps the distribution of the time needed for it to return to a desired state;
or other probabilistic measures. Thus in fault-tolerant computing we talk about
the “coverage” factor of a fault-tolerant mechanism, defined as the probability of
the mechanism successfully performing its function in response to a disturbance
(e.g. detecting a data error, or recovering from it), conditional on the disturbance
(e.g. the data error) occurring; or we talk about the probability distribution of the
latency of a component fault (i.e., of the time needed to detect it) rather than of a
single numerical estimate.
Coverage factors are especially attractive as true measures of resilience. For
instance, if we estimate a probability of a disturbance being tolerated so as not to
cause system failure (a coverage factor, c), and know the frequency f of distur-
bances, then, in a simple scenario with rare disturbances, (1−c)∗ f would give us
the frequency of system failures. The frequency of system failures is a measure of
dependability (reliability), and one can see, for instance, that to improve reliabil-
ity in this scenario one needs either to reduce the frequency of disturbances or to
increase the coverage factor: the latter does indeed represent resilience, how well
5That is, even for many deterministic systems, their behaviour is complex enough that the knowledge we
can build about them is only statistical or probabilistic. For instance, many software systems (deterministic in
intention) have a large enough state space that many failures observed in operation appear non-deterministic
— they cannot be reproduced by replicating the parts of the failure-triggering state and inputs that are ob-
servable [22].
Fault tolerance and resilience: meanings, measures and assessment 15
the system responds to adversity. And, as a concrete advantage, this relationship
between a coverage factor and failure frequency seems to support extrapolation of
dependability assessment to a different environment: I could estimate the former
in the laboratory, usually with artificially frequent disturbances, to make measure-
ment easier, and then I could extrapolate to any environment where the same dis-
turbances occur more or less frequently. This is the basis for the predictive use of
fault injection [33] or dependability benchmarking [28].
Even with complex systems in which multiple components and mechanisms
co-operate to achieve resilience, probabilistic models, as described elsewhere in
this volume, allow predictions of the probability of successfully resilient behaviour
and hence of dependability measures as functions of coverage factors and of fre-
quency of disturbances (internal faults or externally generated shocks).
However, this possibility of extrapolation is actually severely limited. Impor-
tantly, the probability of tolerating a disturbance will be a function of the type
disturbance that occurred. So, all “coverage” measures have to be defined with
respect to some stated type, or mix, of faults or disturbances; and the difficulties of
extrapolation that characterised measures of dependability under stress also affect,
in principle, measures of coverage. In particular, the desirability but also the limits
of “benchmark” scenarios apply when estimating coverage factors just as when
measuring a dependability measure [30].
5.4 Measures of socio-technical resilience
Since we are comparing the understanding of resilience with respect to different
categories of systems, and the categorisation above is derived from examples at
the simple end of the spectrum, it is useful to compare with proposed measures in
the areas of complex socio-technical systems. We take as an example the list of
attributes of resilience in socio-technical systems proposed by Woods [34]; we can
relate them to the categories given above, as well as consider how amenable they
are to precisely defined measures. These attributes are:
• “buffering capacity”, which is essentially an “extent of tolerable disturbances”
as discussed above. The potential difficulties only concern how easily this
can be captured in practically usable measures;
• “flexibility versus stiffness: the system’s ability to restructure itself in re-
sponse to external changes or pressures”. It is not clear how this could be
measured. For instance, to measure flexibility in the observed operation of a
system, we would need to decide which forms of “restructuring” were actu-
ally useful, without the benefit of checking how the crisis would develop if
the restructuring had not taken place. So, the literature tends to describe this
form of “flexibility” through scenarios or anecdotes;
• “margin: how closely or how precarious the system is currently operating
relative to one or another kind of performance boundary”, again related to
“extent of tolerable disturbances”. This has often useful definitions in tech-
nical systems, for instance we can define an acceptable maximum load on a
network before it goes into congestion, or the minimum required set of func-
tioning components necessary for basic services, while in socio-technical
systems it is often difficult to identify what terms like “stretched to breaking
point” may mean, and what measures of “distance” from this point may be
appropriate.
• “tolerance: how a system behaves near a boundary — whether the system
gracefully degrades as stress/pressure increase or collapses quickly when
pressure exceeds adaptive capacity”. This has parallels in many technical
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areas, and certainly in ICT, where “graceful degradation” is a frequent re-
quirement, but for which no textbook, standardised measure exists.
5.5 Measuring the supposed determinant factors of re-
silience
When trying to assess dependability (and resilience) in the face of threats that can-
not be predicted in detail, a proposed approach relies on identifying factors that are
believed to enhance resilience. When dealing with well-understood risks, this ex-
ercise may take the form of simple design analysis. In many cases, assessment can
rely on the combination — via a probabilistic model — of analysing which defen-
sive mechanisms are in place, estimates of their coverage factors, and estimates of
the probability distributions of disturbances to which they will need to react. There
are of course difficulties with all these estimates, which qualify the confidence one
can have in predictions obtained this way. But when dealing with the human and
social determinants of system behaviour, the conjectured determinant factors of
resilience often have a “softer” or at least more complex character. The coverage
and component reliability parameters of a model for a complex socio-technical
system, and even the model itself, would be often too difficult to establish with
any confidence. Only empirical observations of system resilience would then be
trusted.
A concern in the “resilience engineering” literature is that one tends to judge
organisations on their past performance, but these “measures of outcomes” may
lack predictive power: success in the past is no guarantee of success in the future,
due to the extreme extrapolation problems mentioned above. Hence a search for
“leading indicators” that can be used to assess future resilience. Many of these
are cited in the literature. For instance, a review [35] lists measures of “Manage-
ment commitment, Just culture, Learning culture, Opacity, Awareness, Prepared-
ness and Flexibility”, of “Empowerment, Individual responsibility, Anonymous
reporting, Individual feedback, [. . . ]” for individual workers and of “Organiza-
tional structure, Prioritizing for safety, Effective communication” for organisations
(citing [36]); and others.
Such factors are commonly believed to be important in determining how well
an organisation will perform from the safety and resilience viewpoints. So, in-
formed judgements about how “resiliently” organisations will react to stresses will
benefit from considering these “indicators”; if the indicators were reliable, an or-
ganisation might want to identify reasonable target values and levels of trade-offs
among them. But objective measures of such attributes are difficult to define. Dif-
ferent systems can be ranked on ordinal scales with regard to attributes of interest,
or specific numerical, objective measures can be used as proxy measures if shown
empirically to correlate with desired behaviours. For instance, [37], studying the
safety of ship operation, reports a massive effort in which factors believed to in-
dicate “safety culture” were estimated by anonymous surveys of individuals; the
research goal is to check how well these proxy measures correlate to observed
safety performance (such as records of accidents, near misses, negative reports
by competent authorities). If good correlation were found, some function of the
“leading indicators” could be used for early warnings of accidents being too likely
on a certain ship. On the other hand, predictive models akin to those described in
this volume (e.g. [38]), based on such measures and suitable for informing design
of these systems, for instance answering questions like “To what extent should
power be devolved to workers in this system so that the positive effects outweigh
the negative effects?”, appear unfeasible.
Precedents for emphasis on “determinant factors” of desired characteristics ex-
ist in all areas of engineering, as sets of mandated or recommended practices. A
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pertinent example is in standards for safety-critical computing, e.g. [39], where
sets of good practices are recommended or required to be applied in developing
and verifying software, as a function of the criticality of the software’s functions.
This is a reasonable approach, in principle, and yet checking that these practices
were applied is a poor substitute for directly checking that the product has accept-
ably low probability of behaving unsafely: the former (good practice) does not
imply the latter (safe enough behaviour). The difficulties are twofold: there is no
clear knowledge of how much these practices, and their possible combinations,
tend to help; and we should expect that (comparable) systems that are equal in the
extent of application of these practices may still differ in the achieved results (the
levels of dependability).
Indeed, many authors in the “resilience engineering” literature are wary of at-
tempts at quantification, applied to complex systems, as liable to oversimplify the
issues and divert management effort towards achieving required values of measures
that have the “advantage” of concrete measurement procedures but no guaranteed
relationship to outcomes. Others have used quantitative modelling for illustration
and general insight, borrowing physics-inspired formalisms for modelling complex
systems at a macroscopic level [40].
5.6 More detailed characterisations of resilience
Two important topics that have emerged in the discussion so far are: the difference
between tolerance/resilience for “design base”, expected disturbances and for un-
expected or extraordinary (excluded by design assumption) ones; and the possible
need to characterise not just the size of the tolerable stresses, but more detail about
the resilient behaviour in response to different levels or patterns of stresses.
In this latter area, one can look for measures like performability, defined [41] as
the set of probabilities of the “levels of accomplishment” of a system’s function6,
or functions like network throughput as a function of loss of components. These
options are no sharp departure from dependability modelling approaches that are
well established in ICT.
While these measures are meaningful, authors have been looking, as exem-
plified in the previous section, for ways to characterise “resilient” behaviour in a
more detailed fashion, although accepting that the result may be qualitative insight
rather than models suitable for prediction.
To discuss the various parameters that may characterise resilience in an organ-
isation, Woods and Wreathall [42] use the “stress-strain” diagram used in material
science, as in Figure 1. With materials, the y axis represents the “stress” applied to
a sample of the material (e.g., tensile force stretching a bar of metal), and the x axis
represents the degree of stretch in the material (“strain”). When tested, the typical
building material will exhibit a first region of linear response (the stretch is pro-
portional to the force applied), followed by a less-than-linear region and finally by
quick yielding that leads to breaking. As it moves from the linear to the sub-linear
region, the material also moves from elastic behaviour, where the original size
will be regained when the stress is removed, to permanent deformation. A qual-
itative analogy with organisations is made, in terms of “a uniform region where
the organization stretches smoothly and uniformly in response to an increase in
demands; and an extra region (x-region) where sources of resilience are drawn on
to compensate for non-uniform stretching (risks of gaps in the work) in response
to increases in demands”. Thus in the “extra region” it is assumed that an organi-
sation that successfully self-modifies shifts onto a new curve, that departs from the
now-decreasing main curve and gives some extra amount of increase in tolerated
6If “accomplishment” has a numerical measure, e.g. throughput of a system, the system’s performability
is defined by the probability distribution function of this measure.
































Figure 1: Stress-strain diagram.
“stress” for extra “strain”, so as to be able to tolerate stresses beyond its “normal”
maximum.
So, these authors identify a region of “orderly” adaptation to increasing stress
(in some cases one might identify measures of both stress and strain with an ap-
proximately linear relationship, e.g., increased inflow of patients to a hospital be-
ing covered by increasing work hours within established procedures). Beyond this
maximum, the cost-effectiveness of use of resources decreases and a maximum
exists, beyond which extra stress can only be tolerated by some kind of recon-
figuration of the organisation, e.g. mustering extra resources or freeing them by
changes of operation mode.
This view suggests sets of attributes that can be measured to characterise the re-
sponse of the system, like the size of the “uniform” range, and the extra stress that
can be tolerated before the degeneration into failure. The above authors identify as
especially important the ability of an organisation to manage smoothly transitions
between regions, and its “calibration”, defined as its ability to recognise in which
region it is operating, so that reconfiguration is invoked when necessary (and pre-
sumably not too often — we note that in many real situations, the ability to assess
how well calibrated they were for past decisions is limited. One cannot always
tell whether a decision to restructure to avoid catastrophic failure was really nec-
essary — especially in view of the uncertainty that the decision maker normally
faces in predicting the future). They rightly claim that the stress-strain analogy for
organisation behaviour is a first step in clarifying some of the attributes that char-
acterise resilient behaviour (hence also a first step towards quantitative modelling)
and importantly highlight the difference between “first-order” and “second-order”
adaptive behaviour — the “normal stretching” of the organisation’s design in the
uniform region, vs the more radical restructuring to work beyond the “normal”
limit — but note the limitation of representing “stress” as a unidimensional at-
tribute, and the need for further work. A limitation that seems important is that
this kind of graph implicitly assumes that the stress-strain relationship can be plot-
ted as independent of time. This matches well those measurement processes for
the strength of materials in which stress is increased slowly, moving between states
of equilibrium at least up to the maximum of the curve. If the timing of the applied
stimulus (as e.g. with sharp impact or repetitive stress) makes a difference in how
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the material reacts, additional properties can be studied, possibly requiring addi-
tional measures. In organisations (or for that matter in computers), many of the
stresses may need to be characterised in terms of dynamic characteristics, or need
to be defined in practice in terms of timing characteristics of events.
Considering the time factor may also bring into play other aspects of self-
stabilisation, and other necessary design trade-offs, which can be illustrated by
analogy with other engineering examples, outside the science of materials. For
instance, making a ship more “stable” (increasing its metacentric height, so that it
will self-right more promptly after heeling to one side) makes it also more liable
to roll at higher frequency following the tilt of the waves, a characteristic that can
reduce the effectiveness of the crew, make a warship unable to use its weapons,
etc. Likewise, all “resilience” that relies on detecting (or predicting) component
failures or shocks must strike a compromise between the risk of being too “opti-
mistic” — allowing the situation to deteriorate too far before reacting — or too
“pessimistic” — reacting too promptly, so that false alarms, or reactions to distur-
bances that would resolve themselves without harm, become too much of a drain
on performance or even damage resilience itself.
6 Conclusions
A theme running through this survey has been that as fault tolerance (or resilience),
that is, dynamic defences, exist in all kinds of systems, the measures that may be
appropriate for studying them also belong to similar categories and the difficulties
in defining measures, in performing measurements, and in predicting the values of
measures also belong to common categories. Interest in studying and/or in extend-
ing the use of fault tolerance or resilience has expanded of late in many areas,7 and
we can all benefit from looking at problems and solutions from different technical
areas. I gave special attention to the “resilience engineering” area of study, since
its choice of topic problems highlights extreme versions of measurement and pre-
diction problems about the effectiveness of “resilience” that exist in the ICT area.
In all these areas there are spectra of prediction problems from the probably easy to
the intractable. The “resilience engineering” movement has raised important issues
related to the measurement and prediction of “resilience” attributes. One is simply
the recognition of the multi-dimensionality of “resilience”. For instance, Westrum
[27] writes: “Resilience is a family of related ideas, not a single thing. [. . . ] A
resilient organization under Situation I will not necessarily be resilient under Situ-
ation III [these situations are defined as having different degrees of predictability]
Similarly, because an organization is good at recovery, this does not mean that the
organization is good at foresight”.
The boundaries between strict technical ICT systems and socio-technical sys-
tems are fuzzy, and for many applications the recognition of social components in
determining meaningful assessment of dependability is important [3]. Concerns
about improving measurement and quantitative prediction are often driven by the
concrete difficulties in applying existing methods in new systems: just as increas-
ing levels of circuit integration and miniaturisation made it unfeasible to monitor
circuit operation at a very detailed level via simple probes and oscilloscopes, so the
deployment of services over large open networks and through dynamic composi-
tion may create new difficulties in measuring their dependability. More general
problems may arise, however: do we need to choose appropriate new measures for
characterising the qualities of real interest? If they are amenable to measurement
7U.S. Navy aircraft carriers exploited redundancy for safety long before Rochlin and his co-authors
studied it. On the other hand, their study prompted more organisations to recognise forms of redundancy in
their operation, and protect them during organisational changes, and/or to consider applying redundancy.
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in practice, to what extent will they support trustworthy predictions? To what ex-
tent may the benefit of “reasonably good” measures (perhaps acceptable proxies
for the “truly important” ones) be offset by natural but undesirable reactions to
their adoption: designers and organisations focusing on the false target of achiev-
ing “good” values of these measures, perhaps to the detriment of the actual goal of
dependability and resilience?
These questions underlie all assessment of resilience and dependability, but
more markedly so as the socio-technical systems studied become less “technical”
and more “social”. Authors in “resilience engineering” have identified research
problems in better characterising, even at a qualitative, descriptive level, the mech-
anisms that affect resilience. Quantitative measurement may follow. Quantitative
predictive models may or may not be feasible, using results from the abundant
research in modelling — at various levels of detail — the dependability of com-
plex infrastructure and ICT; quantitative approaches from mathematical physics
[40] may also yield insight even without predictive power. Research challenges in-
clude both pushing the boundary of the decision problems that can be addressed by
sound quantitative techniques, and finding clearer indicators for these boundaries.
There are enough historical examples of quantitative predictions proving mislead-
ing, and perhaps misguided, but we often see these with the benefit of hindsight.
Perhaps most important would be to define sound guidance for “graceful degra-
dation” of quantitatively driven decision making when approaching these limits:
more explicit guidance for exploiting the advantages of measurement and quanti-
tative prediction “as far as they go” but avoiding potential collapse into unrealistic,
“pure theory” driven decisions making.
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